Idealism - Idealism – Berkeley Skeptic – one that...

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Unformatted text preview: Idealism – Berkeley Skeptic – one that doubts everything – doubting is a suspension of belief between affirming and denying a proposition. Philonous – denies that matter exists [independently of the mind] The theorems and principles of science are not derived; they are universal intellectual notions. Therefore, independent of matter. Which of us denies the reality of things which are perceived by the senses? Do the senses perceive mediately or immediately? EX. Reading a book – letters are the things sensed, not the words. Therefore a words meaning is not a sensible thing. A “sensible thing” means only those things that are perceived immediately by sense. Therefore, though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and reason concludes there must be some cause of that diversity of colors, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing or perceived thing by the sense of seeing. Hear a variety of sounds cannot hear the cause of the sounds. Feel something hot and heavy you cannot say that I feel the cause of its heat or weight. Hylas – senses perceive everything immediately, for there are no inferences. Heat is a sensible thing. Hylas: to exist is one thing, to be perceived is another. Therefore, heat must exist without the mind. Hylas ‐ whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it. Phil ‐ What! The greatest as well as the least? Hylas – they are both perceived by sense; nay the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived. Therefore, if there is any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree. Phil – is not the most vehement and intense degrees of heat a very great pain? Is any unperceived thing capable of pain and pleasure? Material substance is a senseless being. An external object is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it. Pain is distinct from heat; and is the consequence of heat. Hylas – Put your hand near a fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation or two? Both pain and heat are immediately perceived. Pain and heat are not distinct. You cannot form for yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure; in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells . . . [ sounds, colors] Hylas’ concession – A very great heat cannot but exist in the mind. Therefore, it is not any real being! Application of the law of identity to show that there is an absurdity in Hylas’ doctrine. Ex. One hand cold and another hot. Place in water of tepid temperature and the water will be warm to one and hot to the other. Therefore, it is both cold and hot – a contradiction. Hylas insists that it would be absurd to say, there is no heat in the fire. Ex. Pin prick and burn. Both rend the fibers of the flesh and cause pain. The pain is not in the pin or the fire. What about colors – in the object. There is nothing visible but what we perceive by sight. All things perceived are perceived immediately [and are in or from an external object] Is a corporeal substance either a sensible quality or made up of sensible qualities? Corporeal substance is nothing distinct from sensible qualities. The colors seen in a cloud are not actually in the cloud. The colors are only apparent. How do you distinguish actual color from apparent color? By coming closer, the nearer you are the more real is the color. Difference between the microscopic and the macroscopic. Here the difference is between micro‐sensory knowledge and macro‐sensible knowledge. Secondary qualities of an object {color, sound, taste, hot and cold, smells] have no existence without the mind. Primary qualities exist without the mind. Extension, solidity, gravity, motion, rest and figure. Consider extension and figure. Ex. A mite sees its own foot – and things equal or less than it, as bodies of considerable dimension, but to us the mite is barely perceptible. To creatures less size than the mite they will seem larger. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions? No. No real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself. Therefore, extension is not in the object. Therefore, primary qualities suffer the same fate as secondary qualities. But Hylas finds it necessary to suppose there is a “material substratum” without which material substance could not exist. Material substance is not sensible – its modes and qualities being perceived by the senses. Phil – It was by reflection and reason that Hylas obtained the idea of material substance. Turn to substratum. Substratum is under the sense qualities or accidents. Extension is only a mode of the substratum. But extension is included in a spreading. There is for every material objects’ extension an extension of the thing itself but this could go on infinitely. But Hylas maintains that the material qualities cannot exist without some form of “support” Spread doesn’t mean ‘spread’ in the literal sense. Substratum is substance. Substratum stands under accidents! That one thing stands under another it must be supported Hylas – properly speaking nothing can be perceived but ideas ...
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