gault_peciulaitis - Econometrics 140B Group Project:...

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Econometrics 140B Rokas Peciulaitis Group Project: Replication Exercise Walter Gault Performance Pay and Teachers‘ Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics By Victor Lavy Introduction The goal of the original paper The goal of ―Performance Pay and Teachers‘ Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics‖ was to give evidence of improvements in Israeli high school test taking rates, conditional pass rates, and average test scores in English and math after offering individual monetary incentives to the respective Israeli teachers. Monetary incentives, in the form of bonus payments for teachers, were based on the performance of teachers‘ classes in high-school matriculation exams. The bonus program, which is a tournament type with a fixed set of awards, was structured by rank order relative to other teachers‘ results in the same subjects. The measurements of student performance were identified using two indicators of achievements: the exam pass rate and the average score on each matriculation exam. This paper outlines the effect of the incentive program on teachers‘ pedagogy and effort, productivity as measured by students‘ achievements, and on teachers‘ grading ethics. Experiment Teaching system overview The final matriculation score in Israel in a given subject is the mean of two intermediate scores: national exams that are ‗external‘ to the school that are written, administered, supervised, and graded by an independent agency, and a school-level ‗internal‘ exam that mimics the national exam in material and format, but is scored internally by the student‘s own teachers. Students were required to have a minimum of 20 credits to qualify for a matriculation certificate. The data identifies that 45 percent of high school seniors received matriculation certificates during 1999-2000 school year—this passing score is used later on as a benchmark for sample formation. A description of the data set used, short description of the data sample and sample restrictions Tournaments as incentive schemes were suggested because of two reasons: awards based on performance and a fixed set of rewards would stay within budget, and the comparison of how teachers perform relative to others is the most preferred way to measure it. Each teacher could enter as many times as the number of classes he/she taught and was ranked each time on the basis of the mean performance of each of his/her classes. The rankings were based on the difference-in-difference method--differences between the actual outcome and a value predicted on the basis of a regression that controlled for the students‘ socioeconomic characteristics, the level of their study program in the relevant subject (basic, intermediate, and advanced), grade (10 th , 11 th , 12 th ), grade size, and a fixed school-level effect. (These imply that the predicted values were based on within school variations among teachers and the teachers‘ knowledge that they will be compared to other teachers on the same
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This note was uploaded on 09/04/2011 for the course ECON 140b taught by Professor Staff during the Winter '08 term at UCSB.

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gault_peciulaitis - Econometrics 140B Group Project:...

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