139 final study

139 final study - Pelc – compensation appeals to...

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Unformatted text preview: Pelc – compensation appeals to exception Escape Clauses • Any provision of an international agreement that allows a country to suspend the concession it previously negotiated without violating or abrogating the terms of the agreement. o Allows u to not do what u said u were going to do o Wto, if u say youre going to lower tariff rates, may be able to get away from obligation from getting a higher tariff o Defection or violation of earlier promise isn’t necesarryly interpreted as violating treaty - flexibility o Difference between de facto and de jure Us says were gonna put a cap on how high were going to tariff steel , de facto they don’t comply with their agreement, de jure they get out through escape clause and thus are not violati Rigidity • What happens if an institution is too rigid? o When times get too hard rigidity will lead to instability Too costly to break the promise people will leave the institution Deter people from joining in the first place • What happens if an institution is too flexible o People will violate whenever its convenient – shallow treaties = no effectiveness Moderate rigidity • Make escape clauses costly, but payable in extreme circumstances o • Compensation (law merchant) o If pierro breaks trade obligation had bad drougt (australia) , grass died, costly to feed sheep, tough times, they raised tariffs on sheep and sheep related products, if u are someone who is normally dealing with them sheep, pierro should compensate u in someway. • Self enforcing institution - reputatioin o Gatt – dispute settlement • can request a panel to be formed to discuss conflict • pierro can veto panel • panel writes report (verdict) • sent around secretly to all the other members of the gatt • pierro can veto verdict • if he doesn’t veto it it can go to official adoption in which court issues a verdict that is made public • pierros opponent can say I would like a punishment to be placed on pierro • pierro can veto punishment o institution can authorize a punishment o however pierro has to agree to punishment – both parties have to say yes all the time this has happened 3 times in the history of gatt WTO Dispute Settlement changed this system • Legal stage o I go to wto, saying pierro violated oblgations o I request panel (pierro cant veto) o Panel writes report, circulates (cant veto) A ruling by the wto dispute settlement has automatic legal force Much less protection for pierro o Wto allows for a appellate process Heard again by a different panel of judges...
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This note was uploaded on 09/07/2011 for the course POLI SCI 139 taught by Professor Staff during the Spring '11 term at UCLA.

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139 final study - Pelc – compensation appeals to...

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