Strategic games - Page 25 realized assigns to each state...

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Page 25 realized assigns to each state the probability if and the probability zero otherwise (i.e. the probability of ω conditional on . As an example, if τ i ( ω ) = ω for all then player i has full information about the state of nature. Alternatively, if and for each player i the probability measure p i is a product measure on and τ i ( ω ) = ω i then the players' signals are independent and player i does not learn from his signal anything about the other players' information. As in a strategic game, each player cares about the action profile; in addition he may care about the state of nature. Now, even if he knows the action taken by every other player in every state of nature, a player may be uncertain about the pair ( a , ω ) that will be realized given any action that he takes, since he has imperfect information about the state of nature. Therefore we include in the model a profile of preference relations over lotteries on A × (where, as before, ). To summarize, we make the following definition.
Background image of page 1
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 09/10/2011 for the course DEFR 090234589 taught by Professor Vinh during the Spring '10 term at Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online