A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 7

A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 7 - Criterion...

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Page vii 8 Repeated Games 133 8.1 The Basic Idea 133 8.2 Infinitely Repeated Games vs. Finitely Repeated Games 134 8.3 Infinitely Repeated Games: Definitions 136 8.4 Strategies as Machines 140 8.5 Trigger Strategies: Nash Folk Theorems 143 8.6 Punishing for a Limited Length of Time: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion 146 8.7 Punishing the Punisher: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Overtaking Criterion 149 8.8 Rewarding Players Who Punish: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Discounting Criterion 150 8.9 The Structure of Subgame Perfect Equilibria Under the Discounting
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Unformatted text preview: Criterion 153 8.10 Finitely Repeated Games 155 Notes 160 9 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games 163 9.1 Introduction 163 9.2 Complexity and the Machine Game 164 9.3 The Structure of the Equilibria of a Machine Game 168 9.4 The Case of Lexicographic Preferences 172 Notes 175 10 Implementation Theory 177 10.1 Introduction 177 10.2 The Implementation Problem 178 10.3 Implementation in Dominant Strategies 180...
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This note was uploaded on 09/10/2011 for the course DEFR 090234589 taught by Professor Vinh during the Spring '10 term at Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

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