A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 9

A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 9 - 231 12.4...

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Page viii III Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 197 11 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 199 11.1 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information 199 11.2 Principles for the Equivalence of Extensive Games 204 11.3 Framing Effects and the Equivalence of Extensive Games 209 11.4 Mixed and Behavioral Strategies 212 11.5 Nash Equilibrium 216 Notes 217 12 Sequential Equilibrium 219 12.1 Strategies and Beliefs 219 12.2 Sequential Equilibrium 222 12.3 Games with Observable Actions: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
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Unformatted text preview: 231 12.4 Refinements of Sequential Equilibrium 243 12.5 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium 246 Notes 254 IV Coalitional Games 255 13 The Core 257 13.1 Coalitional Games with Transferable Payoff 257 13.2 The Core 258 13.3 Nonemptiness of the Core 262 13.4 Markets with Transferable Payoff 263 13.5 Coalitional Games without Transferable Payoff 268 13.6 Exchange Economies 269...
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This note was uploaded on 09/10/2011 for the course DEFR 090234589 taught by Professor Vinh during the Spring '10 term at Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

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