A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 25

A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 25 - players...

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Page 9 I STRATEGIC GAMES In this part we study a model of strategic interaction known as a strategic game , or, in the terminology of yon Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), a ''game in normal form". This model specifies for each player a set of possible actions and a preference ordering over the set of possible action profiles. In Chapter 2 we discuss Nash equilibrium, the most widely used solution concept for strategic games. In Chapter 3 we consider the closely related solutions of mixed strategy equilibrium and correlated equilibrium, in which the
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Unformatted text preview: players' actions are not necessarily deterministic. Nash equilibrium is a steady state solution concept in which each player's decision depends on knowledge of the equilibrium. In Chapter 4 we study the deductive solution concepts of rationalizability and iterated elimination of dominated actions, in which the players are not assumed to know the equilibrium. Chapter 5 describes a model of knowledge that allows us to examine formally the assumptions that underlie the solutions that we have defined....
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