A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 32

A_Course_in_Game_Theory_-_Martin_J._Osborne 32 - ( Matching...

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Page 17 Figure 17.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma (Example 16.2) Figure 17.2 Hawk-Dove (Example 16.3). each animal is that in which it acts like a hawk while the other acts like a dove; the worst outcome is that in which both animals act like hawks. Each animal prefers to be hawkish if its opponent is dovish and dovish if its opponent is hawkish. A game that captures this situation is shown in Figure 17.2. The game has two Nash equilibria, ( Dove , Hawk ) and ( Hawk, Dove ), corresponding to two different conventions about the player who yields. • Example 17.1
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Unformatted text preview: ( Matching Pennies ) Each of two people chooses either Head or Tail. If the choices differ, person 1 pays person 2 a dollar; if they are the same, person 2-pays person 1 a dollar. Each person cares only about the amount of money that he receives. A game that models this situation is shown in Figure 17.3. Such a game, in which the interests of the players are diametrically opposed, is called "strictly competitive". The game Matching Pennies has no Nash equilibrium. Figure 17.3 Matching Pennies (Example 17.1)....
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This note was uploaded on 09/10/2011 for the course DEFR 090234589 taught by Professor Vinh during the Spring '10 term at Aarhus Universitet, Aarhus.

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