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Unformatted text preview: 4. A. Solve the following game using iterated elimination of dominated strategies. H M L H 13, 8 1, 4 7, 4 M 4, 1 4, 1 4, 4 L 1, 2 1, 1 1, 4 .b. Find the other Nash Equilibria outcomes 5. Find the Nash equilibria by writing the strategic form of this game. Which of these is subgame perfect? Suppose that there can be two levels of preparedness for gumdrops in defending against an attack by the jelly beans: High or Low. Regardless the level of preparedness, each side has available two options of what it can do: fight or accommodate. The jelly beans payoff is listed first. Gum drops Gum drops Gum drops Jelly Beans Jelly Beans H L f a f f f f f a a a a a 1/2, 1/2 1, 1 1, 1 0, 0 3/4, 1/4 2, 2 0, 0 1, 3...
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 Spring '08
 Woroch
 Game Theory, Utility, jelly beans, Professor Reynolds

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