325Problemset3-Fall05

325Problemset3-Fall05 - plus) higher in industry A or B ?...

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
ECON 325, IO (Fall 2005) Christoph L¨ulfesmann, SFU Homework Assignment #3 This assignment is due on Wednesday, Nov 2 in class. 1.) Please solve Problem 1, p.224 [Problem 1, p. 277 in 2nd ed.] Explain carefully. 2.) There are two industries A and B , and each industry is a duopoly. The firms in industry A are identical. They face an inverse demand , P A = 1 - Q A , and each firm has constant unit costs c < 1. The firms in industry B face a similar inverse demand, P B = 1 - Q B . However, they are not identical. Firm 1 has unit costs c - d , whereas firm 2 has a higher unit cost c + d , where d < c < 1. The firms in each industry play a Cournot game. a) Solve for the Cournot outcome in each industry (quantities, profits, prices). b) Is social welfare (measured by the sum of producer and consumer sur-
Background image of page 1
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: plus) higher in industry A or B ? 3.) Untel and Cyrox are two rms who produce computer chips. Market demand is given by P = 120-20 Q , where Q is total quantity. Both rms have constant marginal costs. However, Untel can produce more cheaply than Cyrox. Marginal cost at Untel is 20, while at Cyrox it is 40. a) Derive the Cournot equilibrium formally. Graph the equilibrium and explain. b) The rms secretly agree to form a cartel. They jointly determine their output levels, and share total prots equally. How much will each rm produce? What will be the prot earned by each (as part of their cartel agreement, they can make payments to each other)? Explain! 1...
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 09/18/2011 for the course ECON 325 taught by Professor Christophluelfesmann during the Fall '08 term at Simon Fraser.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online