BerriBrookJSE2010 - Journal of Sports Economics...

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Journal of Sports Economics
http://jse.sagepub.com/content/11/2/157
The online version of this article can be found at:
DOI: 10.1177/1527002510363097
2010 11: 157 Journal of Sports Economics
David J. Berri and Stacey L. Brook
On the Evaluation of the ''Most Important'' Position in Professional Sports
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On the Evaluation of the
‘‘Most Important’’
Position in Professional
Sports
David J. Berri
1
and Stacey L. Brook
2
Abstract
This article investigates whether general managers in the National Hockey League
(NHL) evaluate the playing talent of goalies efficiently. The authors examine both
the voting record for the Vezina Award (Best Goalie) and salary data from free
agent goalies to ascertain how the goalie position is evaluated by general
managers in the NHL. The authors find that general managers evaluate past
performance of goalies efficiently. However, the authors also find observed
differences in goalie performance are quite small. Furthermore, NHL goalies are
quite inconsistent across time. These aspects of goalie performance are not taken
into account by decision makers in the NHL, leading us to conclude that
inefficiencies in this labor market exist.
Keywords
NHL, Goalies, rationality, decision making
A fundamental assumption in economics is that decision makers are rational, or
more precisely, ‘‘people choose efficiently the means that advance their goals.’’
1
Such an assumption presumes that people are open to—and willing to adopt—new
information. In addition, the process by which people adopt information—as
described below by Douglass North—leads people to the ‘‘correct’’ model.
1
Department of Economics & Finance, Southern Utah University, Cedar City, USA
2
Department of Economics, Tippie School of Business, University of Iowa, USA
Corresponding Author:
David J. Berri, Department of Economics & Finance, Southern Utah University, 351 West University
Boulevard, Cedar City, UT 84720, USA.
Email: [email protected]
Journal of Sports Economics
11(2) 157-171
ª
The Author(s) 2010
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DOI: 10.1177/1527002510363097
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Players must not only have objectives but know the correct way to achieve them. But
how do the players know the correct way to achieve their objectives? The instrumental
rationality answer is that, even though the actors may initially have diverse and erro-
neous models, the informational feedback process and arbitraging actors will correct