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Unformatted text preview: Phil 106, Fall 2010 The Morality of War Hoversten Chapter 3: Non-Classical Wars Our focus in chapter 2 was on when one state is justified in pursuing forceful action against another state . If just war theory is limited to just this kind of action, then it would seem not to cover a wide variety of forceful action that collections of people might engage in. Orends suggestion is that JWT can accommodate non-classical wars by focusing on the key feature of the just cause condition for jus ad bellum . This key feature is response to aggression . Just cause The first condition on jus ad bellum is that a state engage in war only on the basis of a just cause. Orends concern is with one cause in particular, aggression . Aggression is understood as armed attack of another state. Thus, so long as the state being attacked is minimally just, it would seem that aggression involves a violation of one or both of the fundamental state rights (political sovereignty and territorial integrity). Core Principle of Aggression The commission of aggression by an aggressor A, against any victim V, entitles Vand/or and third-party vindicator T, acting on behalf of Vto employ all necessary means to stop A, including lethal force, provided that such means to not themselves violate human rights. Orend provides a number of reasons for the CPA Reasonableness Given its charge to protect its citizens, it is reasonable for V to go to war against A. Fairness To deny V the right to go to war is to require them to accept a loss at the hands of A, which thereby gains from its aggression. We should not unfairly reward states for attacking others in this way. Responsibility A is responsible for the choice that V makes to go to war. If A wants to avoid war with V, it need only cease its aggression. Implicit entitlement In being minimally just, the state has earned the right to war. 1. V is minimally just- V has a right to sovereignty 2. A right to sovereignty- An entitlement to employ resources necessary to secure individual rights. 3. There is no other body with authority to secure individual rights. 4. Defensive armed force is the only means to securing individual rights. 5. , V is entitled to go to war. Notice the qualifier on the CPA: provided that such means to not themselves violate human rights. The other states rights: The weight of reasons given above suggests V is not wrong in fighting back against A (self-defense). This implies that A lacks rights against V. But since rights are impersonal, this also means that any other minimally just state is permitted to attack A on Vs behalf (other-defense). 1 Individual human rights: Whether these are violated depends on whether the principles of jus in bello are met....
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This note was uploaded on 09/27/2011 for the course PHILOSPHY 106 taught by Professor Mcmahan during the Fall '10 term at Rutgers.
- Fall '10