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6.Development_strategy - RegimeType Why...

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Development Strategy and Regime Type: Why Doesn't Democracy Matter? Brian E Crisp The development strategy literature argues that autonomous bureaucrats in authoritarian Asian NICs followed successful export-led growth strategies while Latin American policymakers were pressured by mobilized sectors to maintain doomed import substitu- tion industrialization. What is more, this ISI strategy made the consolidation of democ- racy impossible. However, my research on Venezuela indicates that ISI and democracy can be made compatible---the democratic state was penetrated by business and labor, those avenues for penetration were protected from electoral politics, and the relative participation of business and labor remained fluid. How are recently established democ- racies being made compatible with a new market-oriented development strategy? Evi- dence from East Asia and Latin America indicates that the transition to market-oriented economies and the institutionalization of participation by key sectors have not gone together. Policymakers are trying to isolate bureaucrats from public pressure and cen- tralize power away from bodies vulnerable to electoral oversight. The "deinstitution- alization" of democratic politics may make the relationship between regime type and development strategy unstable. T he comparative development strategy literature does much to advance our understanding of economic motivations and consequences of diverse actors including the state, capital and, to a lesser degree, labor. Scholars have fruitfully compared newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia and Latin America and offered explanations for regional differences in economic strategy and performance (Haggard 1990; Gereffi and Wyman 1990). Drawing conclusions about the rational- ity of behavior by politicians, bureaucrats, and economic interest groups requires Brian F. Crisp is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona. He has pub- lished several articles and book chapters on interest group participation, presidentialism, and economic development. His most recent articles appear in the Latin American Research Review and the Journal of Interamerican Studies and Worm Affairs. His book, Democratic Institutional Design." the Power and Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups, will be published by Stanford University Press in 1999. Studies in Comparative International Development, Spring 1998, Vol. 33, no. 1, 8--41.
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Crisp 9 careful attention to the political contexts in which they operate. "[T]he organizers of interest groups are rational actors; but that also implies that they are strategic. The structure of political institutions and the conduct of politicians shapes the structure and strategies of interest organization; what is optimal lobbying strategy in one political setting would be ineffective in another" (Bates 1992, 282-83). The devel- opment strategy literature pays attention to differences in interest group actors and their penetration of the state across regions, but its findings are limited by the study of authoritarian regimes. Some Asian NICs have recently liberalized politically, but
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6.Development_strategy - RegimeType Why...

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