LN030910

LN030910 - Economics 113 UCSD Prof. R. Starr, Mr. Troy...

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Economics 113 Prof. R. Starr, Mr. Troy Kravitz UCSD Winter 2010 March 9, 2010 1 Lecture Notes, March 9, 2010 Salvaging Majority Rule: Single Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem Arrow Possibility Theorem implies that majority rule or any similar decision-making mechanism on pairwise alternatives cannot generally lead to transitive group preferences. Restriction on space of possible preferences --- purposely violate 'Unrestricted Domain'; limit the space of possible profiles. Single peaked preferences: Suppose all propositions to be decided can be linearly ordered, left to right. All voters agree on the left to right ordering. They disagree on their choices. Everyone has his favorite point; but chacun a son gout --- the favorite point differs among voters. For each voter, as we move to the left of his favorite his utility goes down; as we move to the right of his favorite his utility goes down. Let L be the "is to the left of" ordering. All voters agree on the L ordering. Arrange the propositions a 1 , a 2 , . ... so that a 1 L a 2 L a 3 L a 4 .... , and so forth. For each voter
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This note was uploaded on 09/30/2011 for the course ECON 113 taught by Professor Starr,r during the Fall '08 term at UCSD.

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LN030910 - Economics 113 UCSD Prof. R. Starr, Mr. Troy...

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