HST 306 E.C. - Travis Marschner HST 306-001 The Decision to...

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Travis Marschner HST 306-001 The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb 1) When the Target Committee first met in late April, Hiroshima was not even on the Twenty-first Bomber Command priority list. Hiroshima was looked at as among those which not only were still largely intact but which were also “likely to be unattacked by next August”—and, further, “which the Air Forces would be willing to reserve for our use unless unforeseen circumstances arise.” That is where Hiroshima ranked on the priority list. 2) As the United States Strategic Bombing Survey pointed out, “all major factories in Hiroshima were on the periphery of the city—and escaped serious damage. . .” The major factories were on the outskirts of the city. 3) There were three initial criteria used to determine possible targets. The Target Committee files were declassified in the 1970’s and the three initial criteria were as follows: (1) they be important targets in a large urban area of more than three miles
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HST 306 E.C. - Travis Marschner HST 306-001 The Decision to...

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