Intl Security 23 ArmsRacingAndArmsControl

Intl Security 23 ArmsRacingAndArmsControl - ArmsRacing...

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23 Arms Racing and Arms Control Arms Racing “progressive  competitive  peacetime  increase  in armaments by 2  states or coalitions of states resulting from conflicting purposes or mutual  fears” (Samuel Huntington) A.  Causes: 1.  balancing under anarchy “progressive competitive  peacetime increase in armaments …” 2.  peacetime preparation for war “…resulting from  conflicting purposes or mutual fears how can you be sure of the intentions of the armaments by the  adversary  3.  security dilemma;  offense vs. defense nuclear deterrence o many argue that nuclear weapons are only useful for deterrent  purposes. If this is the case why was there a nuclear arms race  when each side had enough to deter the other. o The influence is all these other ways that states  believe  are  possible o There are  other factors  that drive arms races… 4.  bureaucratic politics industries, private contractors politicians
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23 Arms Racing and Arms Control these are interested actors who want to see an arms race it will bring more money to them When arguments are made that will benefit these groups they will  always make the argument that security requires that more weapons  be built 5.  technology  6.  political prestige:   invidious comparison  Critics of the leaders ask questions about how they are doing relative  to adversaries The adversary may engage in taunting behavior (teasing you) o Done by leader of Soviet Union Peter Khrushchev in late 1950s o This generated fears of missile gap in the US Can cause  self criticism o “Decade of neglect” said of Clinton Administration o people saying that  we’re not doing enough and creating  pressure o this can exist in an authoritarian regime as well  7.  threat perception:  beliefs about other state’s intentions is the other state you’re observing an adversary, a competitor, or an 
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This note was uploaded on 10/14/2011 for the course PSCI 151 taught by Professor Staff during the Spring '11 term at UPenn.

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Intl Security 23 ArmsRacingAndArmsControl - ArmsRacing...

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