Solving_for_the_mixing_probability

Solving_for_the_mixing_probability - Solving for the mixing...

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You will be given a box with cells showing the success probability for the Row player. In the box below, the numbers give the probability that Serena will win the point. Venus Anticipate Anticipate Backhand Forehand Serve to Forehand 70 30 Serena Serve to Backhand 50 80 Step one : Show that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. First, we construct the best responses. Serena’s best response Venus’ best response If Venus plays Then Serena plays If Serena plays Then Venus plays Backhand Forehand Backhand Backhand Forehand Backhand Forehand Forehand Clearly, there is no combination of strategies where each is playing the best response. Step two : Define the mixing probability for the Row player. Let p represent the probability that Serena serves to the forehand. Step three : Plot the success probability for the opponents choice of each pure strategy. If Venus plays Backhand, then the probability that Serena wins the point is
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This note was uploaded on 10/17/2011 for the course ISS 328 taught by Professor Martin during the Spring '10 term at Michigan State University.

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Solving_for_the_mixing_probability - Solving for the mixing...

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