Notes on Personal Identity

Notes on Personal Identity - Personal Identity Plan(1...

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Personal Identity Plan: (1) Restate the views we are interested in. (2) Briefly discuss the basic intuitive appeal of a couple of the views. (3) Discuss Thomson’s reasons for thinking that the Pure Psychological Criterion is to be preferred to the Impure Psychological Criterion. (4) Explain the compatibility of the Pure Psychological Criterion with the view that people are their bodies. (5) Discuss the problems that duplication apparently raises for the Psychological Criterion. (6) A possible hybridist response? (7) Talk about the amended ‘no-competitors’ Psychological Criterion. (8) The circularity problem (9) The extrinsicness objection. (10) Does the Impure Psychological Criterion avoid these problems? (11) Fission (12) The idea that identity isn’t what matters. We are considering a number of conflicting views about the relation of personal identity: (Memory) A person P existing at time t1 is identical to a thing Q existing at a different time t2 if and only if either P can remember the experiences of Q, or Q can remember the experiences of P. (Pure Psychology) A person P existing at time t1 is identical to a thing Q existing at a different time t2 if and only if there are times t and t’ such that Q is at t’ psychological ly connected with P at t, i.e. t’ is later than t, and Q believes at t’ a good bit of what P believed at t, Q wants at t’ a good bit of what P wanted at t, Q seems to remember at t’ a good bit of what P experienced at t, and so on. (Impure Psychology) A person P existing at time t1 is identical to a thing Q existing at a different time t2 if and only if there are times t and t’ such that Q is at t’ psychologically connected with P at t, and P and Q share a brain. (Physical) A Person P existing at time t1 is identical to a thing Q existing at a different time t2 if and only if P’s body is Q’s body. Parfit has a slightly different kind of view, which doesn’t state individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for personal identity. Rather, he offers a sufficient condition: (Parfit 1) If there will be a single future person who will have enough of my brain to be psychologically continuous with me, that person will be me. (Parfit 2) If some future person will neither be psychologically continuous with me, nor
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have enough of my brain, that person will not be me. Note, Parfit’s two principles don’t return judgments about every case, even if we know all the facts about whether the relation of psychological continuity holds, or whether two things share a brain. In what kinds of cases will Parfit’s principles not return a judgment about whether a future person is me? Intuitive Support for the Views
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Notes on Personal Identity - Personal Identity Plan(1...

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