Super Nate

Super Nate - Preventing Acquisition of Nukes Wave 1...

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Preventing Acquisition of Nukes – Wave 1 Proliferation Good 2 Deterrence Bad 2 Unilateralism Good 2 Military Force Solves 3 Iran’s Nuke Program Would be Easy to Destroy 3 Hard Power Good 4 US Cannot Solve – Military 4 Destroying Iran’s Program Would Stretch USAF 4 US Cannot Solve – Intelligence 5 Definitions 5 Miscellaneous 6 AT – Consult UN CP 7 Preventive Action – Good 7 Proliferation Good Nuclear Proliferation is Deterrent Michael R. Kraig, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-Theoretic Treatment,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2. (Mar., 1999), pp. 141-167. First, 'War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains' (Waltz, 1981: 4). Since nuclear weapons raise the specter of complete annihilation of one's population and resources , gains cannot possibly be high enough to risk conflict . Deescalation becomes the norm because escalation risks total loss (Waltz, 198 1: 5). The preceding factors are bolstered by the certainty of devastating losses. The difficulty of destroying 100% of a defender's retaliatory force in an offensive first strike negatively affects any probabilities of gain in a conflict (Hagerty, 1993: 272-273). Unlike conventional forces, countervalue nuclear weapons do not have the ability to destroy other nuclear forces with high efficiency, and the offensive benefits of 'counterforce' weapons have yet to be demonstrated convincingly . Therefore, any technological or quantitative gains in an aggressor's nuclear weaponry will not make the opponent's nuclear force suddenly obsolete ( Feldman, 1982: 50; Waltz, 1981: 6; see also Jervis, 1984: 150; Rathjens et al., 1991: 108). Faced with this inherent inability to destroy an opponent's nuclear arsenal, a potential aggressor's calculations are thereby reduced to the simple question, 'Do we expect to lose one city or two, two cities or ten?' This point underscores the radical qualitative difference between nuclear and conventional wars (Waltz, 198 1 : 6). Deterrence Bad Deterrence is No Longer a Sufficient Defense Robert L. Gallucci [Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University]. Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability. The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, September, 2006. 607 Annals 51 For more than fifty years, the United States has depended on deterrence for defense against its principal adversaries. Though deterrence has never been as fulfilling as denial-- that is, preventing an enemy's access to the homeland--deterrence has worked or, more precisely, not failed to work. We can never be [*52] sure why enemies have not attacked, but if they do attack, we can be sure that we failed to deter them. Yet deterrence can be trusted no longer . Some of today's adversaries value their lives less than our deaths. Such adversaries are not candidates for deterrence . Moreover, while they lack a ballistic missile delivery system,
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Super Nate - Preventing Acquisition of Nukes Wave 1...

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