Preventing Acquisition of Nukes – Wave 1
Military Force Solves
Iran’s Nuke Program Would be Easy to Destroy
Hard Power Good
US Cannot Solve – Military
Destroying Iran’s Program Would Stretch USAF
US Cannot Solve – Intelligence
AT – Consult UN CP
Preventive Action – Good
Nuclear Proliferation is Deterrent
Michael R. Kraig, “Nuclear Deterrence in the Developing World: A Game-Theoretic Treatment,”
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2. (Mar., 1999), pp. 141-167.
First, 'War becomes less likely as the costs of war rise in relation to possible gains'
(Waltz, 1981: 4).
Since nuclear weapons raise the specter of complete annihilation of
one's population and resources
gains cannot possibly be high enough to risk
Deescalation becomes the norm because escalation risks total loss (Waltz, 198 1: 5).
The preceding factors are bolstered by the certainty of devastating losses. The
difficulty of destroying 100% of a defender's retaliatory force in an offensive first
strike negatively affects any probabilities of gain in a conflict
(Hagerty, 1993: 272-273).
Unlike conventional forces, countervalue nuclear weapons do not have the ability
to destroy other nuclear forces with high efficiency, and the offensive benefits of
'counterforce' weapons have yet to be demonstrated convincingly
technological or quantitative gains in an aggressor's nuclear weaponry will not
make the opponent's nuclear force suddenly obsolete
Feldman, 1982: 50; Waltz, 1981: 6; see
1984: 150; Rathjens et al., 1991: 108).
Faced with this inherent inability to destroy an
opponent's nuclear arsenal, a potential aggressor's calculations are thereby
reduced to the simple question, 'Do we expect to lose
one city or two, two cities or
This point underscores the radical qualitative difference between nuclear and
(Waltz, 198 1 : 6).
Deterrence is No Longer a Sufficient Defense
Robert L. Gallucci [Dean of the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University]. Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to U.S.
Vulnerability. The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, September,
2006. 607 Annals 51
For more than fifty years, the United States has depended on deterrence for
defense against its principal adversaries.
Though deterrence has never been as fulfilling as denial-- that
is, preventing an enemy's access to the homeland--deterrence has worked or, more precisely, not failed to work. We can never
sure why enemies have not attacked,
if they do attack, we can be sure that we failed to deter them. Yet
deterrence can be trusted no longer
value their lives
less than our deaths. Such adversaries are not candidates for deterrence
while they lack a ballistic missile delivery system,