final_pr_answers

final_pr_answers - ECON 122 : GAME THEORY Professor Giacomo...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
1 ECON 122 : GAME THEORY Professor Giacomo Bonanno PRACTICE FINAL: ANSWERS 1. Player 2 Contribute Not contribute Contribute 2 , 2 1 , 4 Player 1 Not contribute 4 , 1 0 , 0 Player 1 does not have a dominant strategy. (b) NATURE 1 1 2 Type I Type II 1 - p p Not Contribute Not Contr. Contribute Contribute Not Not Not Not Con Con Con Con 2 2 1 4 4 1 0 0 0 4 4 1 2 0 1 2 (c) Player 1 has four strategies. For example: (1) (Contribute if of Type I, Not Contribute if of Type II), (2) Contribute no matter what the type. Player 2 has two strategies: Contribute and Not contribute. (d) The normal form is as follows: Player 2 Contribute Not contribute Contr. always 1 + p , 2 p , 4 Player Never contr. 4 , 1 2 - 2p , 0 1 If Type I contr. if Type II not 4 - 2p , 1 + p 2 - p, 4p If Type I not if Type II contr. 1 + 3p , 2 - p 0 , 4 - 4p (e) The following is a pure-strategy pooling equilibrium: Player 1: If Type I, then choose not contribute, If Type II, then choose not contribute Player 2: choose contribute (f) If p
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 10/10/2011 for the course ECN 122 taught by Professor Bonnano during the Spring '10 term at UC Davis.

Page1 / 3

final_pr_answers - ECON 122 : GAME THEORY Professor Giacomo...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online