8 Ostensive Definition, Indexicality, ...


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Unformatted text preview: y a demonstration. The content is the object demonstrated. 20 The cognitive significance problem The character gives us the cognitive significance while the content (proposition) gives us the truth value. Unlike Fregean thoughts which give us both. Kaplan claims that the character is the cognitive significance, but we can be more cautious and say that the character helps classifying the cognitive significance. 21 On the basis of these distinctions and clarifications we can appreciate Wittgenstein’s discussion of the first person. Wittgenstein distinguishes between the use of ‘I’ as subject and the use of ‘I’ as object. 22 The First Person The point on which he [Wittgenstein] seemed most anxious to insists was that we shall call ‘having toothache’ is what he called ‘a private experience […]’; and he said that “what characterises ‘primary experience’ is that in this case, ‘I’ does not denote a possessor.” […] He said that ‘Just as no (physical) eye is involved in seeing, no Ego is involved in thinking or having toothache’; and he quoted, with apparent approval, Lichtenberg’s saying, “Instead of ‘I think’ we ought to say ‘It thinks’ (Moore 1959: 302­3). 23 Anscombe’s argument Anscombe argues that “I” is not,...
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This document was uploaded on 10/26/2011 for the course PHIL 2504 at Carleton CA.

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