Bordo, Monetary Policy, Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History

Bordo, Monetary Policy, Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History

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Unformatted text preview: (Tantt'thell, Bl'llt't‘X1.S,ltttj/l‘y/lSt’tgttl’tn’tt/ ltgt’t'eti/Inttt. Hit) H {/1 ("anr l)t‘ld_5.1L‘,3(l(l(l, llary‘ey, Barhara 1:. Urine (tittz’ Urine tit lug/tint]. lit/‘1) MW): Hie ,‘tltittuy‘lit‘ lit/tet’iettt‘e, t)\lord, 109,1. Henderson, .lohn S, flirty ttttt/ Charity in late ,llt‘ti I‘lot't‘ttte (1y, lord, 1904. Knoyt'les, Day id, (Vit‘isiitttt l/otittslt‘istti. tondon, Hot}, Mels'itterielt, Rosamond 1'), "Town and Monastery in the (Tarolingian Period In Nat t‘l/tttr/t in Jittt'tt and (‘ottti/t’rst'tle, \‘ol, in o1 Stiitz’tux‘ [it (V/J/H't‘tltllfiiy‘ftt/‘y‘,t‘tlllt‘tl17Vllt’tt‘hliztlfl‘tippWH 1112. (Mlord, 1‘17”. l’ttllat‘t, Brian S ly’it‘lt nitrous of it (titling/it Stu/u tit HOW, ()ytotd, 1‘171. Sotttl‘tern, Rieltatd \‘\. lies/wit: Site: (715m it :1! ‘liit'ltZ/e 'lljt s. 11arm<tndsyyorthi 1‘9‘70 at l’oot'ttt llt'rittrs‘sttttre lr'riwe: //’t Nit tut [text T‘s/ttIEt‘yEEil‘ftR"? PUHQY See Stahilt/ation Policies. ll/lfihili'lifiil‘é’ft’ STir‘tNUARDS. ‘t n'tonetat‘y standard relers to the set ol monetary arrangements and institu- tions «goyerninet the supply of. money. lt dillers l'rom the term tttotie/at‘y' Fee/tile, delined as a set o1 monetary arrangements and institutions aeeontpanied hy a set oley— peetations hy the public with respeet to polieyntalx‘er :te» tions and by t‘tolieytnalyers ahout the puhlies reaetion to theiraetions. 'l‘here are two dist ingttisltahle aspeets ol t'nonetary stan' dards/t'ettimes: domestie and international. 'l‘he domestit: aspet‘t relers to the it'tstitutional ;,ti‘t'attt1etttettts and poliey at’tions o1. n'tonetary authorities. ’l'he international aspeet telates to monetary arrangements hetueen nations. the two haste types o1 monetary arrangements are ttyed and lileyil'tle exchange rates, alonet \\1tlt a nutnl’terol intertnedi~ ate \ariants, ineludin}; adittstahle pegs and ttiattajted lloats, llistorieally, the mo types o1 monetary standards reunites are those hased on eonyet‘tihility ol all tornts o1 money into ettrreney‘, pet'terally specie, and those hased on halt the lort'ner pretailed until tlte 1930,» although the llretton Woods system lirotn 1044 to 1971 etnhodied an in“ direet link to gold; the latter has held styay eyer sinee. The Theory of Specie Standards as Domestic Stan— dard. The specie standards adopted as liar haelt as aneient times are types ol' eommodity t‘noney standards, which have generally been based on silyer, gold, or himetallism (gold and silver eoins eit'eulating at a fixed ratio oli their Weights), lrloyyeyer, other eomn’tt‘tdities, stteh as hronze, copper, or eo\\'rie shells haye also been used, Under a speeie standard stteh as the gold standard, the monetary authority delines the \yteight oleold eoins or else fixes the priee ol~ an otmee ol gold in terms oi the national ettrreney or t'noney-t)li-aeeottnt, By heing willing to buy and sell gold lreely at the mint priee, the authority t‘t/t UN ll’li/‘t RY STAN DA R DE; 3331 t'naintains the liiyed pt'iee. ()yynership or use ol' gold is un» restricted The Theory of Specie, Standards as International Standards. The international specie standard eyolyed lxt'tttt't dotnestie standards with the eommon l'ixingz ol' the speeie priee hy dillerent nations, t‘nlilte later arrange— ments, the elass‘ieal tzold standard, \yhieh preyailed lrom 18th) to 1914,\\‘asnot lltCI‘L‘s’ttlltdttll111101'11211101'131LtQt‘tT- ment hut \yas driyen lat gely hy tnarlx'et liorees. Under the elassieal gold standard li\‘ed.exeltaneesrate system, the World's ntot’tetary‘ ttold stoelx' \yas distrihttted aet‘ordinf‘t to the menther nations" detrtztnd tor money and use t>li>§t117sll1111vk tor gold, lilisturhant‘es to the halantie o1 payments \yere atttotttttttt‘ally et‘tuilihratt-d 1n; the nrtee— speeie llmy nteeltanism as elahorated liy l>ayitl llttttte 11711 17761). 1 ndet tltut titt'eltgtnism, arhitraee in gold lsept the priee lt,“CClsttli\:tt'1<ttts natittns in line \\'lllt eat‘h other. (‘entrztl hanlts also played an it'nportant role in the inter.- national gold standard hy \‘Ltt’y‘lttg their diseoui’tt rates and using: other tools o1 monetary policy, therehy speeding up Lttlltts‘lttle‘lll1t)1711121l'lL‘t‘atli-ptty‘ltit‘lllfs diseqttilil'tria. The Specie Standard as a Rule. ()tte ol the most im- portant leatures ol the specie standard was that it emhodv led a monetary rule or eotmnittnent tneeltanisni that eon» strained the aetions ol the monetary authorities, lo the t'lassieal eeonomists, it was prelerahle lor monetary an» thorities to l'olloyy rules rather than to stthieet monetary politiy to the dist‘retion o1well—meaning: olliieials. \to\y a rule seryes to hind poliey aetions oyet‘ time This yieyy oli sutlt poliey rules, in eontrast to the earlier tradition that stressed hoth intpersonality and automatieity, stems: lrom the reeent literature on the time lneonsisteney ol' optimal goyernn’tent poliey. ltt terms oli tlte modern perst’wetit'es o1 ls'ydland and Pieset‘dt (W771 and lfittrt‘o and Gordon {193%}, the rule seryed as a eotnminnent meehanism to preyent goyet‘tr ments lrom setting polieies sequentially in a time—ineotr sistent manner. :\CC()1‘tllllg to this apt'troaelt, adherenee to the liiyed priee ol'gold \\'as the eon'm'titinent that preyented goy ertnnents lrom creating: surprise lidtteiary money is- sues in order to eapture seieniorage reyenue, or l‘rom de. lltttltinf.t on outstanding debt (Bordo and Kydland, 1996). On this hasis, adl’terenee to the specie standard rule helore 1914 enabled many eotn’nries to ayoid the problems o1 high inllation and staellation that troubled the late tyyentiu eth eentttry: the speeie standard rttle in the century helore World War 1 ran also he interpreted as a eorttingzent rule. or a rule with escape elattses (Grossman and Van lluyelt, 1988; Bordo and Kydland, 199611 The monetary authority maintained the standard“"kept the price ol‘ the ettrreney in tertns oil l speeie lixed, exeept in the event o1 a \yell-understotit 3 3} Z M (l N ETA RY Sill/7t N DA R D 8 emergency, sueh as a major war, in \vartin'te, it might susw pend speeie eom'ertibility and issue paper t'noney to fi— uanee its expenditures, and it eottld sell debt issues in tertns oi the nominal value ofi its tn’tdepreeiated paper, The rule was eoutingent in the sense that the public under stood tltat the suspension would last for only the duration oi the wartime et'nergeney plus some period of postwar adittstn’tent, and that afterwards the government would adopt the deilattonary polieies neeessat'y to resume pay ments at the original parity, ()bsertin}; sneh a rule would allow tlte government to smooth its ret'entte from diflet’ettt sourees of linattee: taxa— tiott, borrow ittgz. and seieniorttee t E,.tteas and Stolyey, NS}; \ y t ,‘ylatilyiw, itit‘th. that itt wartimer present tayes on labor effort t'L‘titlet’tl output when it was needed most. but rely me on future ta\es or borrow liitl was optimal. In the saute time, positive eolleetion eosts might also make it optimal to use the inflation tax as a substitute for eonyentional t;t\* es tl'lordo and \‘egth, 3002;». .\ ten'tporary suspet'tsion ol eonvertibility then allowed the faoyertttnet'tt to use the opti~ mal tniv of the three sottrees of finance. The bttsit: speeie standard rule is a domestic rule, en— lioreed by the reputation oi the speeie standard itself, that is. by the historieal evolution ofspeeie as money: .»\n alter~ ttatiye eomtnitn‘tent meehanism was to guarantee gold eonvertibility iii the Constitution. as was the ease in Swew den before Nil (Joining, th—lt, ;\lt hotttth the speeie standard rule originally evolved as a domestie eommitment tneehanism, its enduring: fame is as an international rttle: namely, maintenanee ofspeeie eott~ verttbility to the estal'ilislted par. .‘vlaintenant‘e of a fixed priee ofi gold by its adherents in lttt'tt ensured liyed e.\v ehantge rates lite ft\ed prtee oi domestie ettt‘reney in tertns oi speeie served as a nominal aneltor under the in» ternational monetary system. Fiat Honey Standards. Although a speeie standard stteh as the gold standard has the desirable ptoperties ofi atttomatieity, of providit'ttz a eredihle eotnmitment tneelta— nism, and ofipt’odtteing long-term priee le\ el and eyehanee rate stability, it also has defeets that argue the ease fora ii- at standard. 'l‘hese inelttde swings in the world priee level beeattse oi the vagaries of the gold standard (gold demand and sttpply shoely's); the high resouree eosts of' basing the monetary system on speeie; inadequate sttpplies of pre- eiotts tnetals to prevent long—run dellation; the interim- tional transmission oi the business eyele and financial erises via the iixed-exel’tange rates of the speeie standard; and the tendeney to violate the rules of the game and to in- nore the need for eoopet‘ation, The ease fora fiat, tnoney standard is that it eottld in the- ory provide a stable money supply, growing at a rate sulfi- eient to mateh the long—run growth of otttpttt without de~ flation attd witlt minimal resottree eosts (Friedt'nan, 1900). Moreover, under a fiat regit'ne, monetary and fiseal policy ean be used to otiset shoely‘s to the real eeonomy and smooth the business eyelet Similarly, fiat money and a floating. exehantze rate ean insulate the dt’tmestie eeonomv from foreign real shoelv's, Finally, the issue oi fiat money ean serve as an inflation tax on the real purchasing power of money balanees to provide tax revenue during emergens eies, lo aeltieve many of these positive attributes oi a fiat money standard, the monetary authority needs a eredible eot't'tmitn'tent meehttntsm to renotmee any resort to sus- tained t't'toney issues over the amount required to mateh lotiffi’l‘ttti real growth. in the t'tit‘teteenth~eentttry enyiron. ment in \\ltit:lt adltet‘ettee to the speeie standard reigned supreme, the issue oi paper money by a government was tolerated only during: temporary wartime etnereeneies. sueh as duringi the suspension period in lit'teland during.t \ I the sapoleot'tie wars. Permanent paper money issue was anathema beeattse oi the heliefi that it would lead to pen ntanent and Qi‘t)\\ll'it§ inflation; and one \\'L\llA(l<tL‘llillL‘lilv‘Ll eyat‘nple is tltat ofitlte British “paper poutth inflation from 1797 to 18] 5‘ As a result, the basie trust between the pttlilie and the government ett'thodied in speeie eoins eroded. This view gradually el'tangaed in tlte twentieth eenttny World \Var I led to a breakdown of the elassieal gold stair dard and to high or hyperit’tfilation in the belligerent eoun» tries. The high real eosts ofi the disinflation required to rev store gold eonyet‘tibility at the original parity prodtteed severe eeonomie and soeial prol‘ilmns itt many postwar western eottntries. (irottps harmed by the deflation that gold standard adherent‘e imposed gtained politieal power. 'l‘hey laid the groundwork forthe ease for managed money and the end oi the gold standard fll‘lltllL’lltllt’L’lt, 1992: l’olanyi, lv—Hl. llowey er, the transition irorn speeie to a ii” at standard that would t'natelt the priee ley el stability that had been aehieved by the speeie standard tooly' most of'the twentieth eentttry to aeliieve. Monetary Standards from Specie Standards to Fiat Money: Bimetallism and the Gold Standard. The use oi precious metals taold, silver, eoppet’) as t'noney ean be traeed back to aneient Lydia. ‘l‘hese metals were adopted as money beeattse of their desirable properties (durability, reeognixahility, storability, portability, divisibility, and easy standardixation). Earlier eommodity money systcms were bimetallic:weold was used for highwaltte transac— tions, silver for low-value ones. The bimetallic ratio (the~ ’tC mint price of ratio oi the mint priee oi gold relative to tl that both silver) was set close to the market ratio to ensure metals eireulated. (f)the.rwise, the overyalued metal . ~ .- .. , t ' 'teeor— drive the undervalued metal ottt of ttiettlatton. 1“ t would dance wit lt Greshams l.aw, The problems that plagued early bimetal I coins and d “C sySlCmS were periodie shortages of\ smaller silver deterioration in quality (Glassman and Redish, 1988; Re- dislt, 2000; Sargent and Velde, 2002). They were dealt with by debasen'iet'it and alteration ol the bimetallie ratio, England ultimately solyed the problem ol‘ deyising an el— licient commodity t'noney standard (Redish, 2000) by shitting to a ntonornetallie gold standard with token silyer coins early in the nineteenth century, a tianslorntation made possible by technical it'i'tproyei'nents in eoin produc- tion Another problem lacing eoinn’todity systet'ns in the prettiodern era was the tendeney ol' monarelts to debase the currency to obtain i‘e\entie in wartit'ne. The deyelop» t'nent oli ell'ieient tax systems and the use of. standardized coins ended the praet iee (Bordo, 1‘9801, .»\lthotigh the gold standz'rd operated relatiyely smoothly lor elose to tour decades. the episode was punctuated by periodic linancial erises. in most eases, when laced with both an internal and e\ternal drain. the Baitly o1 England and other littrot'iean eentral banlts liollowed Bagehot's rule ol‘ lending lreely bttt at a penalty rate. 0n seyeral oceasions (e.g., 1890 and 1907) men the Bank ol' England's adherv enee to conyert ibility was pttl to the test and, according to liichengreei‘i (19921, cooperation with the Banque de France and other central banks was required to saye its ad~ heren'ce. Whether tltis was the case is a ntoot point: the cow operation that did oecur was episodie, ad hoc, and not an integral part ol‘ tlte operation ol' the gold standard 01 greater importance is that during periods ol linancial et‘ises, priyate eapital llows aided the Bank ()1. lingland. By 1914, tlte gold stat'tdard had eyolyed de lacto into a gold exchange standard. in addition to substituting other national lltittt‘ittt'y iitoneys tor got i to eeotiomi/e ott scarce gold reseryes, many countries held eonyertible loreign ev t’ltange (mainly deposits in London) as international re~ series. Thus, the system eyolyed into a tnassiye t'tyratnid oli eredit built upon a narrow base nlgoldi The possibility of a conlidence crisis, triggering a collapse ol the systetn in- creased as the gold reseryes oi the center diminished ('l‘rilliit, 1960). The adyent ol World War 1 triggered the collapse. The belligerents serambled to conyert their ottt— standit'ig lot‘eigtt liabilities into gold Jr’tltl'tough the gold standard was reinstated iii two yariants later in the twentis eth century it could neyer be restored to its origii'tal struc— ture interwar Gold Exchange Standard. The gold stair dard was reinstated alter World War 1 as a gold exehange standard. Great Britain and other eottntries, alarmed by the postwar experience o1 ii'tlla‘tion and exchange—rate in; stability, were eager to return to the haleyon days ol‘ gold conyertibility belore the \\'Ltti The system reestablished in 1925 was an attempt to restore tlte old regime bttt to econ- otnize on gold in the lace oli a pereeiyed gold sl’tortage. Based on prii’tciples deyeloped at the Genoa cot'ilerenee in 1922, metnl’ters were encouraged to adopt central bank a; M 0N E'T‘A RY STAN 1,)ARL S 533 statutes that substituted loreign exchange l‘or gold re~ seryes and discouraged t old holdings by the prit'ate seetot‘. wt! The new system lastet only six years, crumbling alter Great Britain's departure l'rom gold in September 1931. The, system tailed because olseyeral latal flaws in its strtie~ hire and because it did not embody a credible commit. ment mechanism. The liatal lilaws included the adittstt'nent ptoblet'n (asyn'tv n'tetric adjust ntent between deliicit countries such as (ire-at Britain and such surplus eountries as lattnee and the inn» ed States); the lailure by eotmtries to tollow the rules oli the gold standard game leg, both the tinned States and i‘tltttck.‘ sterilized gold tilowsi; the liquidity problem (inadew tittate gold supplies. the wholesale substitution oil lyey cut» reneies lot" gold as international resert es, leading to a conw yertibility crisis't: and the conlidence problem tleading to sudden Sltllilx amtmg lx'ey curreneies and between l«;ey etti> rencies aitd goldl (Rordo, 1903; iflicltengreen, 109(1). The eomniitment mechanism ol the interwar gold stair dard was much \\‘eitl\’el'tltLttt that ol‘tlte classical gold stan~ dard. Because monetary poliey was politici/ed in many countries, the commitment to com ertibility was not be- lieyed. Hence, inyt‘tldng the ct‘tntingeticy clause and altet> ing parity would haye led to destabilizing eapital llows. :‘dloreoyer, central bank cooperation was limited, The sysv tern eollapsed in the lace ol 1 he shoelss ol' t he (,lreat Depresv sion. Bretton “lands. The Hretton Woods s} stem was the last speciea‘elated standard. it was a \‘ariant ol' the gold standard in the sense that the tinned States tthe most inr portant romtnet’cial power) delitted its parity iit terms o1 gold, and all other members deli ned their parities in terms firetton oi dollars. The .\rtieles o1 .v\greemcnt, signed at l ‘y’t'oods, New Hampshire. in W44, represented a L‘lttttpt't>~ misc between Atneriean and Brit ish plans 1 combined the llexibility and lreedotn lior policynialx'ers oli a lloating rate system, whieh the British team wanted, with nominal stav bility ol the gold standard ritle, etnpliasixet by the tamed States; The sy stem established a pegged exe tange rate sysi tent, but members could alter their parities in the lace o1 lundat'nental diseouilibrium. Py'leinbers were eneottraged to use domestic stabilization polieies to (11361 temporary disturbances, and they were proteeted lrom speenlatiye at- taek by capital eontrols. The lnternational 1 1onetary Fund (la/11"?) was created to proyide temporary iqttidity assisw tance and to oversee the operation ol the system, Although based on the prineiple o1eonyertibility, the Bretton Woods systent dillered lrom the classical gold standard in a ntti'nberollitu'idan'tental ways. First, it was an arrangement mandated by an intert'tational agreement bev tween goyernments, whereas the gold standard evolyed in; lormally lirom priyate arrangements. Second, doi'nestic poliey autonomy was et'ieottraged even at the expense o1 F5 34 M O N liT/‘t RY STA N DAR DS conyertihility, in sharp contrast to the gold standard, lor which conyertihility was key. Third, capital movements were suppressed by controls it became an asyn'imetric system, with the United States rather than Great Britain as the central country The llaws til the Bretton ‘y-K'oods system echoed those ot the gold exchange standard. .»\diustment was inadequate. prices were downwardly inllexihle, and declining output was cotti’ttet‘cd hy expansionary linancial policyi Under the rules, the pegged exchange rate could he altered, hut rarely was iii practice l'tecause ol lear ol‘ speculatiye attacks, te— llcct ing market heliels that goyernments would not pursue the policies necessary to maintain com'ertihility (liichetr green, WWI), Hence the system was propped tip hy capital controls in its early years and hy (ii » l (l and l.\ll‘ lendii’ig in the lateryears. ‘l'he liquidity prohlem echoed that olithe in» terwar gold exchange standard. .va a stthstitute lior scarce gold, the system relieel increasingly on “LIST. dollars gener« ated hy persistent lKS. payments delicits The lirench re- sented the resulting asymmetry“ hetween the lfnited States and the rest ol the world The Bretton Woods conlidei'tce prohlem was rnanilest in the risk ola run on US. gold re- seryes as outstai'tding dollar liabilities it'tcreased relative to gold reseryes. The Bretton Woods system collapsed hetween l9o8 and 197k The lftiited States hroke the implicit rules ol the dols lztr standard hy not rnait’itaining price stahility. The rest ol‘ the world did not want to ahsorh additional dollars that would lead to inflation. Surplus countries (especially Gen many) were reluctant to t‘e\ alue. Another important source ol strain on the system was the unworlathility ol the adjustahle peg under increasing capital tnohility Speculation against a lixcd parity could not he stopped hy either traditional policies or internation- al rescue packages. The i'tntericans' hands were lorced hy rumors ol British and lircnch decisions in the summer ol l97l to conyert dollars into gold. The impasse was ended when President Richard Nixon closed the gold window on 13 August W7 l i The Managed Float and the Fiat Standarc . As a reac— tion to the flaws olx Bretton \\'oods, the world turned to generalized lloating exchange rates in l\/ arch 1973. Though the early years ol the lloating exchange rates were olten characterized as a dirty lloat, wherehy monetary au— thorities extensively interyened to al‘l‘ect hot i the leyels and volatility oli exchange rates, by the 1990s i eyolyed in— to a system where exchange market interyention occurred prin'tarily with the intention ol‘smoothing lluctttations. The advent ol generalized llt’tatit'ig in 1973, a lowed each country more llexihility to conduct independent monetary policy, lit the 1970s, inllation accelerated as adyanced countries attempted to use monetary policy o maintain lull employment l~lowteyer, monetary policy could he used to target the level ol unemployment only at the expense ol' accelerating inllation (Friedman. 1968; l’helps, wrist in addition, the United States and other countries used ex~ pai’isionary monetary policy to accommodate oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979. The high inllation rates that en— sued led to a detern'iit'ted ellort hy monetary authorities in the United States, the United Kii'tgdom, and other coun- tries to disinl‘late, The 1980s witnessed renewed emphasis hy central hanks on low it'ililation as their primary til not sole) ttl‘7lkig. tiyei Although no lortnal monetary rule has heen estalt- lished, a ntttnher ol eout'ttries hare granted their central hanks independence trout the liscal authority and liaye al— so instituted mandates lor low inllation or price staltility ln sortie t‘cspects‘ lor the linitcd States and other major countries there appears to he a return to a rule like the con— y’ertihility principle and the liixed nominal anchor oti a specie standard. The European Monetary {Initm (KNEE). Within the context olthe worldwide shill toward a liloating’ e\change rate regime, the tnaiority ol l’iuropeatt countries ltaye opt- ed tor a intmetary union The EMU has many attrihutes ot' the classical gold standard. including perlcctly lixed ex- change rates (one national currency) and the tree rnohility oli goods, capital, and lahoi: lt dillers significantly, howey» er, in that it is hased on a liat standard. The euro is issued and control led l‘ty the European Central Bank The actions oli the independent liCB are constrained hy a mandate tor low inllatiott, which its l‘ounders hoped would serye as the type oi credible nominal anchor that, gaye long—run price stahility to the classical gold standard Mite tt/so lixchange Rates; (iold Standard, (HH/ (no sltant's law, l BIBLHHTRAPHY Hat ro, lx’. l, atttl l), li. (iordon. “Rules, ltiscretion, and Reputation in a \lodel ol I‘ylt‘tnetaty l’olity," /]t')ltll’titl ttt’ ‘tlttttetttt': /*'t‘ttt,‘tttt:tt’~ l2 own lttt tlt. Hordo, \lichac‘l l)‘ "\loney llellation, and St‘ltgttttt'ttflt‘ in the kitten-nth /otttt;tt/ of lltvtit'ttti'r l'l'ttttotttit'x l2 (\entury: .v\ lx’eyiew‘ lzssay,” tl‘):»‘<t‘t. Hordo. \lichael Dr “The lirettou \koods international Monetary Syss I\_\t)tts/t)7’/)}~ tent," ln ,»l Rett’os/tt'c/it'eon i/tt' lire/ton ll'oodsfiy ytt'tnil tt't'ttttliottu/ .llottctttry Rt‘fitt’m, edited hy ,\l. l). Boido and lit liieltettv green. (‘hicztgo 199%. Bordo, Michael l),, and liinn ls'ydlandi "The Gold Standard as a (:ttttl‘ mittnent Mechanism.” In lfcotiotnit Pet's/mtires on the Classical (iv/d Smut/(It'd. edited hy 'l‘antt‘n Bayonmj, Barry tiicltengreetr and Mark 'li‘ttylot‘. (jai'nl'n idge, 1990. liordo, Michael 1)., and Hugh Rockoll "The (iold Standard as a ’(iptttl Housekeeping Seal of J\l)l)li(\\llil.yn./l’ll/7llt1/ll’lrliifillllfillliziIll‘-§I()7W‘ “"2 (lttne NW»), 38‘) 7-3728. Hordo, Michael l).i and Carlos Vent]. “ll Only Alexandct Hamilton llat . t . ~,, i.~v'3'vei'i Reen Argentinean: A Comparison ol the l‘,tttl\ Monctaiy th‘ {Kl/1'12?!” l ences (lli.'\l‘}__’\.‘l}llll£i and the ldillc‘tl States.‘ Joto'na/o/ ‘tlotzt’ ttottztcs (March 3002). liiclteitgreety Barry, IV/ttst’re t‘iltt/Nltil‘y, New Yoi k, l‘l‘lt), 1i1011011g;1‘0011, 3111‘1'1. (111/11011 [7111111137 1711* (111/11 5111111111111 11111] 1/11* <31’011I [)1711’113111111, l9!” [9110.N1WVY111'11‘, 11192. 1511111, 11, G. 7711' (111/11811111111111! INS/1 NM: l111'1111'11 «1111/ 1113011111111. ()\~ 111111, 19112, 17110111111111,111111111, 1]’1'111:1'1111111/ 11111111111118111/11/111'. N0\11\'1111<, 191111. ("11113311111111 1),, 111111 »\11_121*1;1 R0111311. "(,‘111‘10111’1 11011100111111111 111 1-l1111\‘ M111101‘11 1111111111111111111131111110."[hip/111111111113111[511111111111011131111145 (1988), 7397. (1111331111111, 101301101.1.,;1111111111111 1311111 1111\‘1‘11, “S11\01'01§.111 11011111311 (11111111110111 (1111111: 1510113111110 1101111111, R0111111111111111. 111111 1101111111- 111111.” 111,1"11'1111[11111111111110[€012 1110831, 10578 111117, 131111111111, 1", 1111111131310110 111 (11111111111 P111113."11111111111111 I’m/1.110111[5111111111111 S; 1‘,1771,—1731—’1“11, 1111311311111101‘1Ii, 112.111111 \111101 1.8111110»“(111111111111130111111111\1111107 1111103R;111101'111;111111301011111131110 111111 13,. (I 1’1‘1-31‘1111, 1111‘\V1)11111‘\ 1111111 111:1111111111' \1'111111111 ("111111311 /11111111:/11; 1.111111 (1111‘ 11111111 "31211‘11‘13133‘11. 111111111111(311*;>_111'\'\,"11101111111111111("11110011011111S1*1;1111111' 10:1111111'1 111111 1:111101‘; ” /111 11111 111111011101[11111111111103 31111911 137 111 171111111\1,1\'1111, [1101111111 111111411111111111101, \0111111‘11. 111—1 . 1(11111311, 1111100111. "1111‘ 11111111111111 11111101111111 8111111111111 111 1311111111111,” ./11111’11111"111‘1l51‘11; 111 11113111, 711‘} 111111. R0111311, :\11¥_L‘1LL 111 11111111111110 111111 1133111111111 1111111313. (11111111111130, 2111111, 8111:10111f1‘1111111113,111111111111101113101110, [7111['31'01’1'111’1/011111/1811111/1(111111011, 1’1’1110011111,2111)2. 11111111,1111111111.111/111111111111101111111111111.3111111111111, 1911111. 111111111 11 1111111111 NIONEY AND C01NAGE [/7113 1111111 111111111113 1/11‘1‘0 31111011111123, 1111 111'1’1‘1'1011‘ 11111/ 1/131‘1133111113 11/1 111111101‘ 11111/ 11111111130/111/111‘1111111/11/11’1'l75(),/ General Overview 1110 0111331011011111111111 11111111110113 1111115111111111: 1111111011311 111011111111 <11 0\0111111§10. 11 311110 111 1111110, 11 111111 111 11001111111, 111111 111113 111311 11 3111111111111 1111101011011 111111110111, 01111030 1111101111113, 11101110111111117111F1?x0111111110111110111111 1.311011 E01111 111111.31 R111101‘1 (‘111\\’01'110111101111101‘1110111111111101 1)_\' 311111111: 111111, 111 11 1111111011111 001111111111, “111111101 1111113 01111113 111111 01111113 1111\‘ 111111101 11111 01111113 1111111 11111 0111111131” 1111110101, 1111‘1111111'111111113111111111001101131111111111101,1110111111310311001 111111 1110111111011111101111111010111 1011111111 31111710; 31111 1110111~ 111111110X1‘11111’10011111311113111701131111‘01111‘111110 1111111111111111, 111111101311111011111'11111101)001'1110111111’1111111011 111 1110111111 (11111?- 011111'11 1‘111110 0001111111}; 01111111101110 111011‘ 01111\‘0111011170 113 11 1311111101113 1110111111111 Wit1'11n11113 11011111111111 11101101110 111'111‘1011' 1111111303 1111111111» 0v, 111111 11 1011' 1111110 (10111111111113 1110 11301111. (:111'1111’1111'1111' 111111101110101311111 1111111011111110111100111111110111111011111’11111111— 0111111;1111110111113 01111’1111111011131 {711111311111111001111}1110111111? 111‘0 0V11111p103 ()1 111131 Al 1110 1111101 031101110, 11111, 1111111011 13 "11'111‘11'131'1'11111' 11301033 111111 111171111101111110,” 311011 113 1111103 13- 811011 1111001111111131111113111 1111111101111111110311111111: 1111101110011 111030 1311103 1103 01111101111111? 111111101, 31111101111103 01111011 111011131 AND COFNAGE: (101101111 01110111101111 535 111111011111 111‘ 0101111 1111111013 11111130 1331101‘ 011111111113 111 01111— 17011 1111?111111101111111111111111011113301, 111111011111 0111101" 011110111 11'101’11—13311011 11111 11111110111011, 011001111111011111111 11011113113) 111‘ 00111111011111 1'11111'10_\' (01111, 11111111 1111103 11111101 11 1111111 gnu], 1111111). 111 1110111730110011111 111011111111 11103011111100, 1111110 1701\10011 10111111111081810511111011, 111 11100\11‘01'11001130, 111 1111130 111111 311111011 “111111111001111’101110110011111111113." B} 01111111111110;1111111 1110 111111111'1111111103, 11111110111111111104111? 1111311113011 1130 111 111111101777771101111113 111010113011 3111,?1‘11111/11111111 111 1111 001111111111. 1i1‘1111111111313 11111011111 01111111113110 1111* 1111111111011 01110101101 1111111110 11111111211 111001111111111111111 111 1110110011 1111‘ 11111101113 11101‘1111111111101111‘11111111111011111’11111110311111131111111111101130111 111111101,1111010113 11131111111113 111111 1111111131111111313 01111111113110 1111*1130111111111101111111101311101111111111111111111011‘3111?11*1\ :11111 111000111111111V1111110311110, 11131011011111.111011301111111113111110011111111110001111111101130 (1111111111’V‘11SLI111111111111111.1.“11T111111g1‘,1111101112113 13:11’11'1111111111 1'00111‘11311'11111 1110 01541110011111 111111 11111010011111 10111111103 1111‘ 111211’1111111110, 1111111101113 111“0101113111311101: 1110 111131 111011111 111 03011111100 \1'01’0 1111111111111 11001111111}; 0111'1111'1111111103 (111— 11111113 0311111111031110111111?00111103110113111111 131001111131111*1z1l31 111111 111111011 by \1‘010111 111‘ 01111111. 111030 111011111, 1111110101; 11010 31117013011011 1)\‘ 011111011 111111113; 13.311011 11V 11 311110 111' 11 111101111111 01110 1111* 011111311111111101111\‘1‘1111011’1 11101110111111111 111 110171111111. 111011111“, 1111*111111111110110111'1110111113 01'1111110111110111 111 1111110 11\‘ 11110, 111111 13, 111‘ 01111111, 11111101 1111111 11011153 \1'011111011111101101111'11113111'111111;111111 1110111111011111‘11103111111p 11111110 011111 311510031011 111111 1110 311110 31111111 1101111111 111 111111» 0101‘, 1113111111110301113 11111111 031111117103 1111110 3111103 11111111}; 1111111111110011111113 111‘ 110171131111; 113 0111113 (101111011111 111011012 0011111330 111311101 1111111111 11111011111,111‘113 “01111111, 111010111 11111111111111:11101‘13011111111110101111110013,\1'11113p01t11111/011111 1'1111111'1110111113 (113 \1‘0111131110V0111111011101111010111111111111103- 111: 01111131. {:1101‘1111'10,11101110111‘0311111‘00 01131111 0111111111111111 11111110\’ 1011 11111 31117311111111111 111 01111101111110 11111111 1111103 (1,0,, 01111" \‘01‘111‘110 111111 0111111 1111‘ 011111 11.3 11 111011111111 111 0\1‘11111100. 13111113 01111111 133110 1111103 111111 110011 111111 11 31111111 1030110 11.0., 01101100 111 11110111111111-1030110 1111111111101 111 111001 1111113 11111111113, 111111 111113 11111111 1101111110 1111011031 1‘01'011110 111' 101111- 1110 11111 111010111111111101: '1‘110 1111\1‘113111011111113111'1‘1111001'110111 \1'113 111111 111110 1111111013 111111 111 110 0111111110111 111211 1110 111110 011111111111111001111111011011111111111111 111011111111 \1'1111111110111110111 101100111 1110 1111103 111 011111 1111 110111111111. 111 1111111111111, 1110 171111113 \1‘1111111 1'11111111013113113 1111‘ 111011‘ 0113111111013, 111111 01111111 11111110 1111111101113 111' 111110111151 11 0110011 1111 111011 1113011111111 1\g11111 111011111111 01111111 17111111 [111111 1011111111; 11111 1111* 1101111311, 11111 17113111111013 \1‘1111111 \1'111‘111' 111111 11101111101111.311 \1'113 111110011 10110011101110. 0111111110 \1‘113, 1111111131 111\\'11y3 111111 01111111111010, 113111101110“ 1110111110,; 111111 1111111111011 1110 111111111110111111 111 11111111 1111103 011111111011 1110 11110 111 1110 311110, 11 11111 11111 11100111110 11. 111 ...
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Bordo, Monetary Policy, Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History

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