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# H - because H's tend to damage each other too much In fact...

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H:H interaction = 1/2(V-C) because each individual hawk will win half of the time and lose half of the time. In the D:D interaction each will win half of the time and retreat half of the time (retreat with no cost). Which strategy is an ESS? Answer by asking if a strategy can invade. Can H invade a population of D's?: Is payoff (D against D) > payoff (H against D)? i.e., is V/2 > V? Answer = NO, so H can invade a population of D's. Is H an ESS? Is payoff (H against H) > payoff (D against H)? i.e., is 1/2(V-C) > 0? Answer: it depends on the values of V and C: if V > C then payoff to H will bepositive and H is an ESS; if V < C then payoff to H will be negative and neither D nor H will be favored (H will always invade a population of D's until H's become so frequent that they encounter each other frequently. D can invade a population of H's
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Unformatted text preview: because H's tend to damage each other too much. In fact a population of all H's with V<C would go extinct. Thus which behavior evolves depends on the nature of the interactions. One can imagine many other games and payoff matrices that could be built to model other behaviors. The point of all this is to imagine the following: some species have ritualized displays that appear "civil" in an anthropomorphic sense. Have these behaviors evolved through a stage where hawks killed each other (C was high) to their current state where the cost C to engaging in a behavior is considerably less? This question could be addressed by comparing the behaviors of related species and applying the game theory approach....
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