Medical Ethics Harootunian 10/26/11 1 Virtue Ethics (Part 3) Due to the snow storm and the cancelled class, I have expanded these notes for you. Prior to the storm, I wanted to discuss these issues in class without providing you a written explanation of them. I wanted you to take your own notes on these issues, to formulate the arguments and responses on your own, given our discussion of them in class. It’s all part of my grand plan to make you less dependent on my assistance! But, unfortunately, we’re now running short on time, and I’ve notic ed that many of you who have written on these issues, or discussed them with me outside of class, don’t quite understand this second objection from Oakley. Many of you seem to be missing the point of his examples – failing to see how Oakley is using the examples to respond to the second objection. You’re missing the larger dialectic here. So, let me fill in the argument for you. The Second Objection Here is how I would explain the second objection – this is my explanation of the objection, not Oakley’s presentation of it: Being virtuous doesn’t mean being morally perfect. Virtuous people make mistakes. Sometime s virtuous people can be, in Robert Veatch’s terms, “well-intentioned, bungling do-gooders.” A virtue theory’s criterion of moral rightnes
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This note was uploaded on 11/07/2011 for the course PHIL 164 taught by Professor Doviak during the Fall '07 term at UMass (Amherst).