02010wk2_framing

02010wk2_framing - Space System Architecture Required...

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Space System Architecture Required Reading: a) Framing document (02010 week_2_framing.pdf) b) Wertz, James R. and Larson, Wiley J., Space Mission Analysis and Design , Chapters 1 to 4 (02020 SMAD1 to 4.pdf) c) Report of the DSB/AFSAB Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security Space Programs, a.k.a. Tom Young Report (02030AcquisitionReport_2003.pdf) d) Charles F. Lillie, Michael J. Wehner and Tom Fitzgerald, “Multidiscipline Design as Applied to Space,” AIAA Paper, 1998 (02050 Multidiscipline.pdf) e) Cost Estimating Viewgraphs (02999 Cost Estimating. pdf) Recommended reading: a) NASA Systems Engineering Handbook For over 40 years, space systems have been successfully designed, built, and operated. Over this time, a methodology has evolved for determining an initial architecture for such systems, refining it, and transitioning to detailed design of the space vehicles and other systems in the architecture. These methods were built on a legacy of large, well financed, technology driven programs such as the Apollo lunar exploration missions, early communication satellite work, and a variety of national asset programs focused on cold war needs. There are good technical and historical reasons for current practices. The overwhelming technical reason is that, if done competently and with sufficient resources, they work. Systems engineering practices growing out of the aerospace and defense industries of the 1950’s and 60’s have allowed the creation of systems of unprecedented complexity and technical sophistication. Historically, they were developed in an environment of relatively abundant resources and the attention of a large and highly competent workforce. Most systems were doing either unprecedented new missions, pushing the limits of performance, or incorporating new technologies – often all three at once. Performance and mission success, for national defense and prestige, were the driving motivations. With the conclusion of the cold war, shrinking budgets and shifting national needs in the 1990’s lead to experiments in “Cheaper, Faster, Better” programs designed to do simpler tasks, much faster with much less money. These programs were not always successful, as in general lower cost and tighter schedules were accomplished by accepting increased technical and program risks.
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In this unit, we will review existing methods for determining space systems architectures, as expressed in Space Mission Analysis and Design (SMAD) 1 and the NASA Systems Engineering handbook. 2 The NGST article 3 provides a case study in a properly executed architecture study using 1998’s state of the art techniques on a large, expensive system. The Young report provides a pointed critique of these methods and their implementation on several ongoing programs. This document will amplify some of the points made in the Young report. Finally, the cost estimation viewgraphs get at a basic weakness of all current methods – the reliance on cost estimates that are very likely to be badly off. SMAD
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This note was uploaded on 11/08/2011 for the course AERO 16.851 taught by Professor Ldavidmiller during the Fall '03 term at MIT.

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02010wk2_framing - Space System Architecture Required...

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