A Basic Skeptical Pattern of Argument

A Basic Skeptical Pattern of Argument - A Basic Skeptical...

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A Basic Skeptical Pattern of Argument I want to consider skeptical challenges to claims, not that we can have knowledge, but that we can have justified beliefs, concerning (a) other minds, (b) physical objects, (c) past events, and (d) future events. Skeptical objections to such claims very frequently take the following general form: (1) If a belief is justified, it is either non-inferentially justified, or inferentially justified. (2) It is not possible to have non-inferentially justified beliefs concerning the truth of the propositions in question. Thus, one cannot be immediately, or non-inferentially justified in believing that there are other minds, or an external physical world, or that certain past events have taken place, or that certain future events will take place. (3) That gap between the evidence and the desired conclusion cannot be bridged by means of any deductive argument. Two considerations can be offered in support of this claim. In the first place, it can be argued that the semantical content of the relevant evidence, in each of those cases, differs from the semantical content of the beliefs that one is attempting to base upon the evidence in question. For the beliefs that one is putting forward as one's evidence seems to refer to different
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A Basic Skeptical Pattern of Argument - A Basic Skeptical...

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