A Decisive Objection to the

A Decisive - A Decisive Objection to the"No False Intermediate Conclusions Approach The thrust of the objection is as follows Consider

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A Decisive Objection to the "No False Intermediate Conclusions" Approach The thrust of the objection is as follows. Consider Gettier's "Brown in Barcelona" style counterexample to the traditional tripartite analysis of knowledge. Let e be evidence that John has that provides good reason for believing some proposition p, and let q be some other proposition. Suppose that p is false, but q is true. Suppose, finally, that John believes that either p or q, and that he has arrived at that belief in the following way: (1) John knows that e. (2) John knows that e provides good support for p. (3) John believes that p, and he does so because of (1) and (2) (4) John knows that p entails p or q. (5) John believes that p or q, and he does so because of (3) and (4). John's belief that p or q is presumably justified, since it is entailed by another belief - the belief that p - that is justified. The belief that p or q is also true, by hypothesis. But it isn't a case of knowledge, even though it is a justified true belief. The "no false intermediate beliefs" approach blocks this counterexample, since there is an
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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