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Unformatted text preview: An A Priori Argument for the Reliability of Memory? Traditionally, philosophers have almost always held that if is true that one's memories are reliable, this is only a contingent truth, rather than a necessary one. This view can. moreover, be supported as follows. First, it is surely true in any particular case that there is nothing necessary about a given memory's being correct; it is surely conceivable that any apparent memory could be mistaken. But then, secondly, it is natural to suppose that if it is only a contingent matter whether any particular memory belief is correct, the same must be true with regard to any pair of memory beliefs: the falsity of one memory belief is surely compatible with the falsity of the other memory belief. But, then, if this is right, adding more memory beliefs will not, it would seem change things: the fact that all the memory beliefs in some set of n memory beliefs are false...
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.
- Fall '09