Argument 8 - Argument 8: Armstrong's Epistemic Objection...

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Argument 8: Armstrong's Epistemic Objection Armstrong's third argument in Perception and the Physical World might be put as follows: (1) If sense experiences involve emergent properties that one is directly aware of, then one can get from knowledge of such experiences to knowledge of physical objects only if either (i) phenomenalism, or (ii) the representative theory of perception is true. (2) Phenomenalism is false, and the representative theory of perception is false. (3) Therefore, the postulation that sense experiences involve emergent properties leads to the skeptical conclusion that one cannot have any knowledge of physical objects. (4) Therefore one should reject the view that sense experiences have emergent properties. Two Responses: Response 1 : This argument overlooks the possibility of a Sellars-style direct realism, according to which the occurrences of experiences with emergent properties is causally prior to beliefs about physical objects, but there are no beliefs about those experiences that are epistemically
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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