Armstrong - Armstrong's Objections to Classical...

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Armstrong's Objections to Classical Phenomenalism Armstrong, in his discussion of phenomenalism in his book, Perception and the Physical World , offers the following six objections to classical, or reductive phenomenalism: (1) Phenomenalism entails that unperceived physical objects have only a "hypothetical" existence; (2) Phenomenalism entails that a universe that contained no minds would contain no matter either; (3) Physical objects are determinate, and cannot be constructed out of indeterminate sense experiences; (4) Phenomenalism cannot explain the public nature of space and time; (5) Phenomenalism can give no account of the numerical difference of different minds that exist at the same time; (6) Phenomenalism cannot provide a satisfactory account of the nature of a mind. Objection 1: Phenomenalism Entails that Unperceived Physical Objects Have Only a "Hypothetical" Existence Armstrong's first objection is one that is not as clear as it might be. Phenomenalism, as we have seen, does cash out talk about unperceived physical objects in terms of hypothetical, subjunctive conditional statements about the experiences that perceivers would have if they were differently situated. So the existence of an unobserved tree in the quad is, according to
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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Armstrong - Armstrong's Objections to Classical...

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