Attack on the Closure of the Cosmological Argument

Attack on the Closure of the Cosmological Argument - Attack...

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Attack on the Closure of the Cosmological Argument Kant argues as follows. Since necessary existence is incomprehensible, we have no knowledge of the properties of a necessary being. For all we know, a finite being could be necessary. ( p. 498) However, even if we grant that we can have no knowledge of the positive properties of a necessary being, it does not follow that we cannot know what properties are incompatible with necessary being. We do know many finite beings, including physical facts. We know these to be contingent -- hence, we can know that the necessary being is not physical, does not have a beginning, is not composed of separable parts, etc. Nothing Kant has said challenges these negative facts. In addition, we know that the first cause is the cause of all contingent facts, and this knowledge may also give us a limited degree of positive knowledge of the first cause. This additional knowledge is not derived by examining our idea of necessary existence, but rather by examining the effects of the first cause. Kant's Views on the Limits of Human Reason
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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