Critiques of van Inwagen

Critiques of van Inwagen - Critiques of van Inwagen's Model...

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Critiques of van Inwagen's Model A. Can God play dice with the world? Unless we are strict necessitarians (everything happens for a sufficient reason), we must admit an element of chance in the arrangement of things. The only question is: should we locate the chance within God (divine arbitrariness, caprice) or between God and the world (van Inwagen's open-ended decrees)? B. Conflict with Divine Simplicity. If Aquinas is correct in thinking that God (as a necessary first cause) must be absolutely simple, then God's will and His knowledge are identical. Consequently, for any contingent fact P, if God knows that P, then God must actively will that P. Since God is omniscient, He must know either P or not-P, and so must will one or the other. Open-ended decrees of the kind described by vI are rendered impossible. Farrer's Theory of Divine Analogy A. Farrer argues that when we assert that "God wills/intends that P", we are attributing will and intention to God in a way analogous to our attributions to human beings. The causal joint
Background image of page 1
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online