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Unformatted text preview: epiphenomenalism is true, and that physiological events give rise to states of consciousness, but that the latter have no causal effects upon physical events, this will not affect one's knowledge of other minds at all if such knowledge is based upon the argument from analogy. Whereas if one's knowledge of other minds rests upon the inference to the best explanation, one will cease to have such knowledge if good evidence in support of epiphenomenalism is discovered. It's unclear how much force this difficulty has. The main question is whether epiphenomenalism is itself a coherent position. Some philosophers would probably reply to this difficulty by arguing that epiphenomenalism is internally inconsistent. Others might argue that even if epiphenomenalism is a coherent position, we can know that it is not true, and thus the suggestion that our knowledge of other minds, if based upon the inference to the best explanation, might be undermined at some future date, is not a real possibility....
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- Fall '09