Direct Realis1 - Direct Realism: Searle's Experiences as...

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Direct Realism: Searle's Experiences as Intentional States Version In the selection from John Searle's book, Intentionality , which is reprinted in Pojman's anthology, Searle puts forward a type of direct realism that does not seem to agree exactly with any of the preceding three positions. Searle is very far from being as explicit as one would like about what his position is, and it would have helped if he had said how his position differs from other formulations of direct realism. As I interpret Searle, his view is very similar to that of Sellars, in that he holds that there are sensuous properties, but that these are not properties of physical objects. But he seems to diverge from Sellars in holding, not that experiences cause beliefs about physical objects, but that experiential states themselves are also belief states, in view of their causal interconnections with desires and actions. (The first appendix to this chapter contains a more detailed exposition of this interpretation of Searle.) Finally, there are three alternatives to direct realism. All three of these alternatives share
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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