Direct Realism: "Naive", or "Pre-Scientific", or Manifest Image Version This is the view, accordingly, that perception can provide one with non-inferentially justified beliefs about physical objects, and that the properties that objects seem to have under favorable conditions of perception are properties that they in fact have. So the "manifest image" of the external world is a true image. Almost all present-day direct realists would, however, give a negative answer to the question, "Is the 'sensuous quality of redness' something that exists in the external world, as a property of the surface of physical objects?" When this is done, the next question to consider is this: (2) Is the 'sensuous quality of redness' something that exists inside one's mind , as a property of one's experiences? If one is a direct realist, and also gives a "Yes" answer to this question, one is embracing either the following position, or else John Searle's view - which is described below: Direct Realism: Sellars' Version
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.