How is this Relevant to the Argument from Evil? A. The soft-determinist has reason to reject premise 4: that the best possible world contains no evil. Any possible world containing no evil also contains no free actions. The value of existence of freedom outweighs and absorbs the lesser negative value of moral evil B. The other three positions have reason to reject premise 5: that God could (with certainty) actualize any possible world. 1. According to the Molinist, there are possible worlds God knows He cannot actualize, because He knows that the free creatures involved would not cooperate appropriately. 2. According to the anti-Molinist libertarian, God could have tried but failed to actualize a better world, God's failure again being due to the uncooperativeness of creatures. 3. According to the OP-indeterminist, there are two possibiliites. God might have tried and failed to actualize a better world, the failure being due to the uncooperativeness of chance (i.e., to bad fortune). Alternatively, it may be that God actualized exactly the world He
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