Indirect Realism Requires Fewer Basis Rules

Indirect Realism Requires Fewer Basis Rules -...

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Indirect Realism Requires Fewer Basis Rules This second point follows on immediately from the preceding point. For unless something like  the Principle of the Prima Facie Credibility of All Beliefs can be sustained, the direct realist will  need to accept basis rules that entail that beliefs about one's own present beliefs can be  noninferentially justified, along with other  basis rules that entail that at lest some beliefs about  the past are noninferentially justified, or at least  prima faci e credible. The indirect realist, by  contrast, needs only the former basis rules.  What Level of Confidence Is Justified for Beliefs about the Past? The idea that one can be absolutely certain concerning propositions about the past does not seem  at all plausible. On the contrary, C. I. Lewis's idea that beliefs about the past are, on their own,  and initially, only prima facie credible, rather than being noninferentially justified, seems quite  appealing. But if it is not appropriate to treat propositions about the past as certain, then what   level of confidence is appropriate? The direct realist cannot, I think, provide any principled way of answering this question. A level 
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.

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Indirect Realism Requires Fewer Basis Rules -...

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