Lewis on Naturalism I. "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism" from Lewis's On Miracles A. The distinction between the two senses of 'because': cause/effect, ground consequent. Popularly, the two seem incompatible: if a belief is caused, then it was not deduced. This was the original version of the argument, presented to the Socratic Society at Oxford. Philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe replied, arguing that caused does not imply irrational. B. Lewis's reconstructed argument. 1. If naturalism (or any other thing) is known, then human inference must be (in general) reasonable. 2. If the presence or absence of rational grounds has no causal influence on the inferences we draw, then the our inferences are not in general reasonable. 3. If naturalism is true, then the presence (or absence) of rational grounds cannot have any causal influence on anything (including the inferences we draw). 4. Something can be known only if it is true. Consequently, if naturalism is true, then nothing can be known.
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