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Unformatted text preview: Memories of Experienced Events Versus Memories of Facts Some philosophers feel that it is epistemologically important to distinguish between one's memories of events that one has personally experienced - or, perhaps more precisely: one's memories of one's own experiences - and one's memories of facts not connected with experiences, or experienced events. (Thus, for example, one may remember that Hume was born in 1711, even though one does not remember Hume's being born.) In particular, it has sometimes been contended that, on the one hand, if one apparently remembers having had a certain experience, then one is justified in believing that one did in fact have that experience, whereas, on the other hand, that if one seems to remember that some proposition, unconnected with one's experience, is true, one is justified in believing the proposition only if one can also recall the...
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- Fall '09