Metaphysics and Epistemology of Causation

Metaphysics and Epistemology of Causation - Metaphysics and...

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Metaphysics and Epistemology of Causation A Revised Version of My Argument As I argued last week, the sort of argument from contingency that I have tried to carry out depends in the end on a particular view of the asymmetry of causation, namely, that effects necessitate their causes (where both effects and causes are considered as tokens rather than as types). If we add such a principle to our set of assumptions, it is possible to construct an argument for the existence of a necessary first cause that is different in several respects from the one I gave in my 1997 paper. Here's a revised version of the argument: 1. Assume that there is at least one contingent fact. 2. This fact must have a wholly contingent part (see my paper). Let's call this part x. 3. Normally, a fact has a cause (the defeasible causal principle). 4. So, x has a cause. (from 3). If this cause is not wholly contingent, then it has a part that is a necessary cause of x. So, assume that this cause of x is wholly contingent. 5.
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Metaphysics and Epistemology of Causation - Metaphysics and...

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