Objection 2: Strawson's ObjectionStrawson's objection to the argument from analogy is somewhat difficult to disentangle. It is contained in the following passage from his essay "Persons": "To put it briefly: one can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to others; one can ascribe them to others only if one can identify other subjects of experience; and one cannot identify others if one can identify them only as subjects of experience, possessors of states of consciousness. "It might be objected that this way with Cartesianism is too short. After all, there is no difficulty about distinguishing bodies from one another, no difficulty about identifying bodies. And does this not give us an indirect way of identifying subjects of experience, while preserving the Cartesian mode? Can we not identify such a subject as, for example, 'the subject that stands to that body in the same special relation as I stand to this one'; or, in other words, 'the subject of
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person, Concepts in metaphysics, Cartesianism