Objections to the Argument from Analogy I think it is correct to say that the majority of contemporary philosophers feel that the argument from analogy does not provide the property dualist with an acceptable account of the justification of one's beliefs about the states of consciousness of other people. There are a variety of reasons that have been offered for thinking that the argument from analogy does not do the job. The most important objections seem to me to be the following: (l) The verifiability objection; (2) Strawson's objection; (3) The checkability objection; (4) The objection that the reasoning is inductively unsound; (5) The objection that the reasoning lends only very weak support to the conclusion; (6) The objection that, though the argument from analogy is in principle sound, it implies that justified beliefs about other minds presupposes detailed neurophysiological knowledge. My comments on the first four objections will be relatively brief. I think that the crucial
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