Possible Answers to Skepticism about Memory Knowledge

Possible Answers to Skepticism about Memory Knowledge -...

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Unformatted text preview: Possible Answers to Skepticism about Memory Knowledge One common way of responding to skeptical challenges to knowledge claims is by advancing some appropriate reductionist claim. Thus, for example, phenomenalism, in viewing physical objects as constructions out of possible sense experiences, provides an account of how one can get from knowledge of sense experiences to knowledge of physical objects. Similarly, logical behaviorism, in holding that mental states are reducible to observable behavior, and behavioral dispositions, provides a possible solution to the difficult problem of knowledge of other minds. Is a reductionist approach plausible in the case of beliefs about the past? Here such an approach would involve holding that propositions bout the past can be analyzed in terms of propositions about the future. This view has certainly been embraced by some philosophers. In particular, it was accepted by the Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz and the New Zealand philosopher of time...
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  • Fall '09
  • JorgeRigol
  • direct realist view, R. F. Harrod, appropriate reductionist claim., logician Jan Lukasiewicz, possible sense experiences, New Zealand philosopher

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Possible Answers to Skepticism about Memory Knowledge -...

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