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Unformatted text preview: Reason There can, it would seem, be cases where there are a number of beliefs, none of which is more likely to be true than false, but which nonetheless render some other belief likely to be true. For consider the following: B1: Mary told me that p; B2: John told me that p; B3: Bruce told me that p; ..... Bn: Suzanne told me that p; Suppose now that my state is such - perhaps I am slightly drunk - that I am somewhat inclined to believe each of these - it seems to me that it may be that I remember the corresponding event - but, given that I am aware of my present state, I think, of each potential memory, that it probably is not reliable. Nevertheless, though each individual potential memory is probably mistaken, what about the following, disjunctive belief: B: Either B1 or B2 or B3 or ... Bn ? For this belief to be mistaken, all of B1, B2, B3, ... Bn would have to be mistaken, and while it is likely that each one is mistaken, the probability that they are all mistaken might very...
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- Fall '09