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Unformatted text preview: Skepticism and Memory Knowledge The general strategy underlying the skeptic's challenge to knowledge claims is familiar. Applied to the case of beliefs about the past, it runs as follows: (1) Suppose it is granted that one knows, or is justified in believing, that one now has some beliefs about the past, or that one is having some thoughts about the past, or enjoying some memory images. (The skeptic may not view the first of these as by any means unproblematic, since it, unlike the second and the third, is not a matter of knowledge of a present state of consciousness .) The question then is how such facts about present states of oneself can possibly serve to justify claims about past states of affairs. How is one ever to bridge the gulf in logical type that exists between statements about the present and statements about the past?...
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.
- Fall '09