Skepticism with regard to Physical Objects

Skepticism with regard to Physical Objects - properties(ii...

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Skepticism with regard to Physical Objects This is the view that one has no justified beliefs about either the existence of, or the nature of, external, mind-independent, physical objects. (Compare Berkeley's view. Berkeley, however, is not skeptical here, since he thinks that one can offer good reasons for holding that there are no physical objects.) The next four positions are versions of direct realism , where this is the view that perception can provide one with non-inferentially justified beliefs about physical objects. This general position comes, however, in versions which differ with regard to at least three important issues, namely: (i) Does perception provide one with direct access to some physical properties - such as colors - and hence with justified beliefs concerning the intrinsic nature of such
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Unformatted text preview: properties? (ii) Are sensory experiences intentional states - for example, nothing more than the acquisition of beliefs, or dispositions to have beliefs, about physical objects - or are they, on the contrary, non-intentional states? (iii) Do our non-inferentially justified perceptual beliefs about physical objects arise via a causal process that runs through sensory experiences? The different versions of direct realism that philosophers have advanced can be generated by asking the following questions: (1) Is the 'sensuous quality of redness' something that exists in the external worl d, as a property of the surface of physical objects? If one is a direct realist, and also gives a "Yes" answer to this question, one is embracing the following position:...
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