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Unformatted text preview: Talk about Physical Objects Versus Talk about Sense Experiences The arguments offered above may seem to support the conclusion that terms that are used to attribute observable properties to physical objects can in principle be understood in terms of terms that are used to attribute corresponding properties to sense experiences . But one must be careful not to leap to that conclusion. For suppose that one accepts the claims, first, that terms that are used to attribute sensuous properties to experiences can be ostensively defined only in circumstances where one has an experience that really has the relevant property, and secondly, that it is therefore appropriate to take such terms as semantically basic. How can one get from sentences that involve such terms, such as (1) Experience E is a red* experience (or: an experience of the red variety) to sentences attributing corresponding properties to physical objects? The natural route involves two steps. First, one needs an analysis of sentences about how a physical object looks or appears, such as the sentence: (2) Physical object P looks red....
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This note was uploaded on 11/09/2011 for the course PHI PHI2010 taught by Professor Jorgerigol during the Fall '09 term at Broward College.
- Fall '09