"That" Clauses and Two Types of Mental States Notice that, when one thinks of mental states which it is natural to view as characterized by intentionality, many sentences about such states involve "that" clauses: they are sentences concerning beliefs that something is the case, or desires that something be the case, or hopes that something is the case, and so on. There are, of course, sentences that attribute mental states that seem to be characterized by intentionality where the sentences don't involve "that" clauses - such as, e.g., "Bruce is looking for a unicorn". But might not one plausibly be argued that such sentences can always be rewritten so that they do contain "that" clauses. Thus, for example, can't one replace the sentence "Bruce is looking for a unicorn" by the sentence "Bruce wants it to be the case that he has found a unicorn", or by the sentence "Bruce is trying to make it to be the case that he has found a unicorn"?? If this is right, it suggests that all mental states that involve intentionality can be described
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