The Complexity Involved in Postulating Emergent PropertiesIn his book A Materialist Theory of Mind, David Armstrong offered a number of interesting objections to the view that there are emergent, sensuous properties. The thrust of one of these objections is that, if one does admit the existence of such properties, one's picture of the world will necessarily be much more complex. This increased complexity has a number of aspects: (1) One is postulating extra properties to deal with only a very small part of the world; (2) One needs to postulate a large number of emergent properties; (3) The causal laws that must be postulated are very different from the laws postulated by physics, and rather peculiar; (4) A large number of new laws need to be postulated. Minds as Making Up Only a Very Small Part of the UniverseArmstrong's first point is that the part of the spatiotemporal world that involves minds is extraordinary small. For almost all of the physical universe, the type of account of reality that is
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