This preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.
Unformatted text preview: justified. But doesn't this mean that John has an irrational set of beliefs if he accepts the proposition that p or q, but rejects the proposition that p, given that the former belief cannot be justified unless the latter belief is justified? If this is right, then John can avoid irrationality, while believing that p or q only by also believing that p. Consequently, though John does not arrive at the belief that p or q by reasoning that makes use of the false belief that p, the latter belief is necessary if John's belief that p or q is not to be part of an irrational set of beliefs. Hence, if one holds that a justified true belief, B, cannot be a case of knowledge if either (1) B is part of a complex of beliefs that is irrational, or (2) there is some false belief in the absence of which B would be part of a complex of beliefs that would be irrational, or (3) the justification for B involves a false belief, the case described above will not be a case of knowledge....
View Full Document
- Fall '09